In addition to the wireless telephony boom, a similar exponential increasing trend in wireless data service -short messaging services (SMS) -is visible as technology advances. We develop a structural model to understand mobile users' behavior in individual consumption of voice and SMS services, specifically, to measure the own-and the cross-price elasticities of these services. The cross-price elasticity is of significant importance because the marketing activities are critically influenced by whether the goods are substitutes or complements. The research context poses significant econometric challenges -one-way and 'step' nonlinear pricing, and discrete (bundle choice)/continuous (quantity choices) mixture modeling. Using detailed individual consumption data, we find that SMS and voice services are small substitutes. Younger users' demand is far more inelastic than that of older users. Finally, we discuss practical implications, conducting policy experiments that capture the effects of change in the strategic pricing scheme.
4/32
The relevant telecommunication literature for our study can be classified into two research topics,
(1) evaluating the demand structure in fixed-line telecommunication, and (2) evaluating the mobile communication demand. In examining the demand structure of fixed phone service, many studies estimate the price elasticity of demand in various contexts. Taylor and Kridel (1990) makes distinction between telephone access and telephone use, and model them while calculating the price elasticity for telephone demand. Distinguishing the use-based (metered) and flat-rate pricing, some researchers investigate how users choose one over the other and also how their demand changes when they choose flat-rate pricing as opposed to use-based plans (Kling and Ploeg 1990; Park et al. 1983 ). Miravete (2002) explicitly models users' uncertainty of the number of minutes demanded in the next month when choosing a plan today. Most of the studies find low price elasticities for local voice services. Kling and Ploeg (1990) estimate the elasticity to be of the order of -0.17 while Park et al.'s (1983) estimate is about -0.1.
In the domain of wireless telephony, the main research stream has been to examine the change of the communication structure and mobile voice communication demand: (1) the demand elasticity of mobile subscription (or penetration) or price mark-ups and costs for cellular providers (Danaher et al. 2001 ; Garbacz and Thompson 2007; Gruber 2001; Hausman 1999; Iyengar 2004; Miravete and Röller 2004) . Iyengar (2004) use individual level data similar to us but do not have information on SMS, and (2) the cross effect of fixed phone service and wireless service or the degree of competition/substitution between mobile and fixed telephones in various situations such as "substitute for long distance fixed phone service" (Ahn and Lee 1999; Hausman 1999; Rodini et al. 2003; Sung and Lee 2002) . Recently, Economides et al. (2005) reports that telecommunication demand can be shifted as a function of cellular service used by households as well. Previous work analyzing mobile communication are focused on only mobile voice service, leaving the impact of SMS out of their research scope or simply employing SMS consumption as a covariate. Given that SMS service is omnipresent, the interaction of voice and SMS services provides an interesting and understudied area. In a recent paper Andersson et al. (2006) analyzes the relationship of two services and the impact of network size on the relationships. However, they use a 5/32 highly aggregated data precluding them for estimating cross-price effects of these services.
Our work is also closely related to the "multiple category purchasing behavior" line of research in marketing discipline. Researchers have begun to understand cross-category relationships in consumers' decision-making, using multi-category models (see Seetharaman et al. 2005 for a review of this topic).
The recognition of cross-category dependencies implies that a consumer's purchase decisions across categories are not independent. In other words, the consumer's decision of whether or how much to buy in one category depends on the consumer's corresponding decision in the related category (Chiang 1991; Niraj et al. 2005; Seetharaman et al. 2005; Song and Chintagunta 2004) . In our setting, SMS and voice are such two categories which impact the consumption decisions of each other. We now provide some details on our data and outline key econometric challenges.
Research context

Data
We collected detailed consumption data on 6847 subscribers to a cellular service provider in an Asian country (the operator was the third largest in the county with more than 2 million consumers at that time) from April 2002 through December 2002. The firm offers two kinds of communication services: wireless voice and SMS services. 2 We have information regarding service consumptions on an individual level: (1) voice service use measured in minutes for each month and (2) the number of SMSs sent for each month and (3) demographic information about the users (gender, age, and marital status). The firm offered five different two-part tariffs to users which they select for themselves. Table 1 shows the pricing scheme offered -the pricing scheme did not change during our research period. 2 Due to disclosure agreement, the name of the firm is not disclosed. The available data was from about 10,000 subscribers for the whole 2002 year. However, the first three months of data was for trial period. But after cleaning up the data, we were left with 6847 consumers. The firm provided WAP service as well. WAP use typically means accessing email, stock quote or any other information on the cell phone. We have information on how many minutes of WAP service were used by each user in each month. But, the usage is too low to be able to analyze the effect. 
One-side and "step" nonlinear pricing
Figure 1 demonstrates budget constraints induced from diverse pricing schemes. If there is no quantity discount in both services, the budget constraint is linear (line). In the case that the quantity discount is linearly related to quantities consumed, and quantity discount is available in both services, consumers face a general nonlinear budget constraint. Voice service is characterized by two-part pricing.
The (average) unit price depends on the chosen plan as well as on the level of consumption. Thus the pricing of voice service is second-degree price discrimination, where every consumer faces the same price schedule, but the schedule involves different (average) prices depending on the amounts of voice service consumed. While the quantity of voice service is continuous, the quantity discount is not continuous but discrete -here we will call it "step" nonlinear pricing (Iyengar 2004) . By contrast, SMS service is sold on a flat, metered basis: with linear pricing and thus the pricing is "one-side" nonlinear pricing. This one-side and step nonlinear pricing affects consumer utility maximization by generating unique budget constraints as shown in Figure 1 . This distinction leads to an interesting and unusual structure to the budget set, which complicates our estimation task but provides us with a useful channel to identify our model. is an extension of kinked budget constraint analyzed by Moffitt (1990) because users can have different types of kinked budget constraints depending on a plan choice at the first stage (we will model the sequence of choices in the next section in detail). Under the same budget, every plan is characterized by distinctive areas indicating available amounts in the voice and SMS dimensions, thus the plan choice at the first stage can be modeled as a discrete bundle choice (Chung and Rao 2003) . Figure 2 illustrates the feasible set for voice and SMS consumption taking into account that consumers first choose a plan and then consumption of voice and SMS given the plan choice. The graph is drawn for a hypothetical budget of 2000 units for voice and SMS (fixed fee to select plan 5).
Figure 2. Feasible area conditional on a voice plan and optimal plan choice
The entire area under the blue line is the feasible set. The shaded areas show the portions of the feasible set which are attainable only under a particular plan choice. The horizontal drops occur when SMS consumption becomes high enough that the consumer must drop to a lower voice plan in order to remain within the budget. To choose the optimal mix of voice and SMS, consumers search for the highest indifference curve which touches the feasible set. The graph draws the indifference curve of one consumer who chooses plan 1 and another consumer who chooses plan 3. In our fully articulated model described below, the total amount spent on voice plus SMS is endogenously chosen by the consumer. In particular, we assume the utility function is quasi-linear in the outside good so that the choice of plan and consumption do not depend on income. The assumption is reasonable since a relatively small portion of Voice SMS Unique feasible area of plan 4
Unique feasible area of plan 5
Plan 1 is the optimal plan choice conditional on the shape of utility function Plan 3 is the optimal plan choice conditional on the shape of utility function 9/32 income is assigned to cellular services (Economides et al. 2005 ).
Econometric Model
Conceptual background
In the case of many goods, a change in the price of a good induces income and substitution effects that affect the quantity demanded of other goods. Two goods are Marshallian substitute if a price increase in one induces a consumption increase for the other. On the other hand, the goods are complements if a price increase in one induces a consumption reduction for the other.
To prove that two goods are compliments, it is not sufficient to show that their consumptions positively co-vary. That is, if we find that high voice users also tend to be high SMS users, this does not imply that they are compliments. Two goods are compliments if an increase of price in one yields a consumption reduction in the other. Manchanda et al. (1999) provides three reasons why multiple categories can be bought together on one shopping trip: (1) complementarity (or cross effect), (2) consumer heterogeneity, and (3) co-incidence. Since the main concern of this study is to examine cross effect, we need to control the two confounders, heterogeneity and co-incidence. To control for heterogeneity in inherent preferences for voice and SMS, we allow customer types to follow a probability distribution (to be discussed later) and let the demand for voice and SMS to co-vary. Furthermore, we also use a user demographic profile to account for heterogeneity. The varieties of co-incidence which are most likely to apply (e.g., habit persistence) can also be accommodated within the correlated user type (or equivalently satiation point) as we model below.
Analytical framework
Our analytical model is based on (discrete) plan choice and (continuous) consumed quantities across two services under the given one-side and 'step' nonlinear pricing. Consumers are assumed to maximize utility by making two decisions at different points on the time horizon. A consumer makes a plan choice decision among discrete alternatives in the first stage. This choice is based on the expected 10/32 optimal consumption bundle reflecting the cross effect. The consumer decides on continuous quantities of service usage in the second stage. As a result, the analytic framework takes the form of a two-stage discrete/continuous mixture choice model. Hanemann (1984) developed a unified framework for formulating econometric models of discrete/continuous choices in which both discrete and continuous choices aim at the same underlying utility maximization decision. But, in their model, the alternatives for discrete choices are essentially (perfect or near perfect) substitutes and thus a consumer prefers to buy only one option (e.g. brand A) at any time and the continuous choice is the magnitude of the option chosen. Then, discrete choice is related to one (brand A) among diverse alternatives (in one category including brand A, B, and C) so that the choice shows the preference of A over the others. An important early papers, that lay the blueprint for these modeling contexts, use discrete choice models such as logit and probit (Albert and Chib 1993) or the multinomial brand choice context (Rossi et al. 1996) . However, the approach used in these studies is not appropriate in our context for several reasons. First, because majority of consumers select both services simultaneously, the assumption that only one alternative has to be selected on a discrete choice occasion is not appropriate. In addition, the continuous quantity decision in the second stage may not be addressed well by the (nested) logit model as transforming continuous variables into discrete variable causes loss of information (Niraj et al. 2005) . Second, in a mixed discrete/continuous context, separate modeling of the two decisions -using a logit model for the discrete choice and regression models for the continuous decision -is incorrect due to endogeneity problem if the quantity decision is not statistically independent of the choice decision and vice versa. Therefore, Krishnamurthi and Raj (1988) first estimate the choice model with a discrete choice model and then estimates the regression model based on the parameters estimated after correcting selectivity bias. Finally, another approach is to treat different combinations (three element vector of discrete plan choice and two continuous consumptions) as different multinomial choice alternatives. However, this approach leads to immense numbers of alternatives making it unviable.
In our context, it is obvious that two decisions are statistically dependent. This violates the basic 11/32 assumption of the two-step approach (limited information MLE). So we have to estimate the model with full information MLE. In the following, we derive the joint likelihood function for the observed consumption data from general distributional assumptions regarding individual heterogeneity and random error terms.
User utility specification
We consider individuals indexed by i=1,2,…,N. The individuals choose voice plans from the set of available plans, indexed by k=1,2,…,5. They then choose continuous quantities (q ik , s ik ), conditional on the plan choice. When a user selects plan k, the user must pay a fixed fee T k to sign up for the plan k, and is allowed to use free quota of voice minutes FQ k . Once the user exceeds the free quota, s/he has to incur the marginal cost, p q per unit. Thus, each plan can be characterized by T k and FQ k . We assume that consumers spend the remainder of their income on an outside good, y i at price 1. 3 We assume that the utility an individual i obtains from selecting plan k and consuming (q ik , s ik ) levels of voice and SMS, at the month t, is quadratic and of the form:
Here, b q and b s represent price response parameters, respectively, which can be used to calculate own and cross-price elasticity. The points, (θ iq , θ is ) represent a user's inherent preference for two services and it varies across users. Higher values of (θ iq , θ is ) represent higher preference for the service. (θ iq , θ is ) is closely related to the concept of consumer satiation point -the maximum consumption level desired for a good at any price (consumer will never demand more than the satiation point even if the price were zero). 4 The quadratic utility structure incorporating the notion of satiation is widely modeled in 3 The price of the outside good is normalized to one. 4 The satiation points are
. The satiation point is composed of three parameters to be estimated and a consumer type. If there is no cross effect (b int = 0), (θ iq , θ is ) is individual i's satiation points. Due to interaction, the satiation point in SMS service affects a satiation point in voice service and vice versa. The mutual influence of the cross effect on satiation points critically depends on the sign of b int . 12/32 telecommunication demand literature (Economides et al. 2005; Miravete et al. 2004 ).
In equation (1), the first term represents the utility obtained from the voice consumption, the second term represents the utility obtained from the SMS consumption, and the fourth term captures the utility obtained from the outside good. As is commonly done, we assume that the utility from outside goods and the utility from the mobile services are separable. Thus the consumption in mobile services does not affect the marginal utility obtained from outside good and vice-versa. 5 However, utilities from the voice service and the SMS service are inseparable. Thus the changes in consumption of one service can influence the consumption of the other service. This interaction is modeled in the third term of the utility specification in equation (1) and b int captures the substitutive effect (if negative) or the complimentary effect (if positive) and no effect (if zero). Thus our specification is very flexible and allows for no effect, substitutive effect, or complimentary effect. Also note the diminishing marginal utility of voice and SMS services.
Consumers first choose an optimal plan and then consume voice and SMS sequentially. We solve the problem with backward induction, starting from the second stage, where an individual selects the optimal quantities for voice and SMS, conditional on the choice of a plan k in the first stage, subject to the budget constraint I i :
where (2) indicates that the marginal price of voice kicks in only if the free quota of minutes is exceeded. Substituting the budget constraint into the utility maximization objective function yields:
5 Some utility from outside goods (e.g., fixed phone service and broadband services) might be dependent on that from wireless services. However the portion of utility from fixed phone service and broadband services is very small (or negligible) as compared to the utility from all other human activity and there are no reports of a consistent relationship between them.
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The first order condition is:
Solving these yield the following demand equations.
Equations (5-1) and (5-2) present the demand curves for voice and SMS services in the two cases:
when the cross effect exists or when it doesn't. The role of b int is clear; presence and absence of b int as well as its sign captures the potential interaction effect of these services. The comparison of equation (5-1) and equation (5-2) on two dimensions of q ik and s ik presents four possible scenarios regarding the change of the optimal consumption bundle of voice and SMS (see Figure 3 ). We can intuitively divide it into two groups -the symmetric of scenario (1) and (3) vs. the asymmetric of scenario (2) and (4) -.
Given the definition and utility specification, the cross effect must be symmetric, whatever its direction is:
increasing in scenario (1) 
Demand function
Due to the nature of two-part tariffs, the demand functions need close inspection. In particular, there are three distinct possibilities -(i) When the satiation point of a user is less than the free quota, (ii) when that satiation point is more than the free quota but the marginal price is high enough that the user does not want to exceed free quota minutes, (iii) when the satiation point is high enough that users consume marginal minutes.
These three different regions are characterized by indifference curves, (IDC min_k , FQC k , and GEC k ) which are derived in detail in next section. 7 These indifference curves are derived by comparing the utilities after plugging optimal ) , ( * * ikt ikt s q from equation (6) into the utility function in equation (3).
The three different regions (and hence demand functions) are:
The customers with a relatively lower value composition: (θ iq , θ is ) = <IDC min_k , FQC k > 8 , can reach their optimal consumption level without exceeding free quota minutes.
(2) Demand Function 2 (DF2)
Demand function 2 represents users' consumption behavior when the optimal consumption level under zero marginal price (for voice) is higher than the free quota: q ik * > FQ k , or equivalently (θ iq , θ is ) = <FQC k , IDC min_k+1 >. However, once the free quota is exceeded, the marginal price of voice minute jumps from zero to three units (leading to a kink in the budget set). Thus, when the users reach this kink (or the free quota minutes), they compare the marginal utility from one more minute of voice service with the marginal cost. If the marginal utility is lower than the marginal cost, they stop the consumption of voice service at the free quota. As a result, their optimal consumption is less than the satiation point and clustered at q ik * = FQ k .
(
3) Demand Function 3 (DF3)
If (θ iq , θ is ) = <GEC k , IDC min_k+1 >, the user consumes optimally by incurring marginal cost because the marginal utility at the free minute is greater than marginal cost. Ultimately, the user keeps consuming more voice service until the marginal utility is the same as the marginal costs.
7 They are all indifference curves in a user group selecting a certain plan and the abbreviations of Free Quote Curve, Great Eater Curve, and InDifference Curve. 8 This notation indicates that the point is between two curves (lines).
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It should be noted that optimal consumptions in the two services are determined simultaneously and that in both DF2 and DF3, the optimal consumptions in both services would be a less than satiation point. Thus, within each plan k, there are three different sub-groups with homogenous demand functions.
We will derive indifference curves, (FQC k , GEC k , and IDC min_k ), in the next section.
User heterogeneity and indifference curves
We show that each individual's demand function is determined by the user type, (θ iq , θ is ). All users whose (θ iq , θ is ) belongs to <IDC min_k , IDC min_k+1 > select plan k. As the first step in deriving IDC min_k , we classify users into 5 groups, which is equivalent to the number of plan choice. This enables us to characterize user heterogeneity from information of plan choice based on the next axioms:
1. If a user is indifferent between two plans (plan k and plan k+1), the cost of plan k (the fixed fee + the variable cost depending on additional usage beyond the free minutes) and the cost from plan k+1 (only the fixed fee of plan k+1) have to be identical, at the expected optimal consumption point in voice service. 9 As a result, the consumer with a higher θ iq will choose a higher plan in order to realize the benefit of the nonlinear pricing scheme. Thus, the ranking of the plans is monotone in θ iq .
2. Even if the marginal cost of SMS service (p s ) is identical regardless of plan choice, the plan choice is affected by θ is due to the interaction. However, the expected optimal consumption of SMS is the monotone transformation of θ iq , which is monotone in plan choice. Therefore, the ranking of the plans is monotone in θ is as well.
3. From axiom 1 and 1, a plan choice is ordered in the magnitude of θ iq (or θ is ), despite of one side nonlinear pricing. That is, the next equation always holds:
4. The indifferent curve between plan k and plan k+1 can be acquired by comparing consumer surplus generated from two plans:
5. The shape of indifference curves (here, the slope of indifference lines) is identical across plans under the assumption that utility function is homothetic.
6. Because the indifference curves according to plan choice do not overlap one another, indifference lines from formula in Axiom 5 will be boundaries for clearly dividing five groups. 9 Since the actual consumption is to some extent out of the consumer's control (in terms of bounded rationality), the expected optimal consumption is determined under uncertainty. But the uncertainty will not change our model once the impact of the uncertainty is zero mean.
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Comparing the indirect utility functions across five plans, we can acquire indifference curves which separate two adjoining plans (From Axiom 4). The indifference curves are given by:
We can see that the indifference curve is affected by three sources: (θ iq , θ is ), (T k , FQ k , p q , and p s ), and (b q , b s , and b int ). From Axiom 5, all indifference curves have the same slope, -1/(b q b int ). The interpretation of the slope is identical to the interpretation of b int : the positive value of b int indicates a substitutive relationship and a complementary relationship otherwise. As a numerical example, plugging real value from our data in equation (7), the indifference curve of plan 1 and plan 2, IDC min_2 , is:
Since (T k , FQ k , p q , and p s ) is exogenous, indifference curves consist of (θ iq , θ is ) and (b q , b s , and b int ) and therefore θ is is a function of (θ iq , b q , b s , b int ) conditional on plan choice k. Equation (6) highlights different demand functions observed within the sub-groups selecting plan k. FQC k and GEC k can be derived in the similar way IDC min_k is derived. Plugging DF(1) and DF(2) for FQC k (DF(2) and DF(3) for GEC k ) into indirect utility, the comparison enable us to get the following functional form of FQC k and GEC k :
The user grouping (15 groups from 14 indifference curves) is illustrated in Figure 4 . 
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Model Estimation
To operationalize the theoretical model, we derive a joint likelihood function. First, we formulate the probability of choosing a plan k and then the probability of observing a real consumption bundle (q ik , s ik ) conditional on the plan choice.
Probability of choosing a plan k
We calculate the probability of an individual i choosing a plan k, from the fact that a user chooses the plan that maximizes utility, conditional on the expected future consumptions (not real consumption) derived from (θ iq , θ is ) and (b q , b s and b int ). 10 The parameters (b q , b s and b int ) are to be estimated, whereas the (θ iq , θ is ) is the user type not observed by econometricians. We make a distributional assumption on unobserved user type (heterogeneity).
We assume that the distribution of the consumers' type, f(θ iq , θ is ), follows a truncated bivariate normal distribution: Since the satiation point can never be less than zero, a truncated distribution is appropriate.
Moreover, normal distribution is very flexible and tractable. We assume that (θ iq , θ is ) follow a joint normal distribution rather than independent normal distributions -i.e., we allow the correlation between θ iq and θ is to capture the unobserved inherent association of two service consumptions. Thus, if ρ > 0, it indicates that the preference for voice service is positively correlated with SMS. The assumption of a joint distribution allows us to examine the cross effect by excluding the impact of inherent association. The parameters (b q , b s , and b int ), means (μ q and μ s ), variances (σ q and σ s ) and correlation (ρ) are the structural parameters of interest to be estimated.
Given the distributional assumption, we can write the probability of a consumer choosing plan:
where 1 min_ min_
Probability of observing (q ik , s ik ) conditional on k
In the second stage, consumers select a consumption bundle of voice and SMS. However, the actual demand observed would not be the same as the expected demand derived from equation (6). The difference between "real" consumption and "calculated or expected" consumption levels occur due to unobserved noise (or random shock) that is unanticipated by consumers. Thus the error term reflects the random shock (or measurement error) the user may experience in a given month. For empirical estimation, we add error term in demand function as an additive form following Burtless and Hausman's (1978) approach. This is very consistent with the usage behavior of the users. Absent error term, all consumers in the DF(2) region should always cluster at the kink; a fact that is inconsistent with data. We assume that the distribution of error terms, ( ) 
Joint likelihood function
Now we can derive the joint distribution of a user i choosing the plan and then choosing (q ik , s ik )
given individual type (θ iq , θ is ). The joint likelihood function for a user i is
Any statistical or econometric model typically makes an important trade-off between using an analytically tractable, but parametrically restrictive specification, versus analytically complicated, but parametrically flexible specification . In a similar vein, our formulation also imposes two nonlinear constraints derived from the concavity condition of utility function, and from the condition of monotone ordering of indifference curves.
(1)
where θ is _IDC min_k and θ is _FQC k indicate intercepts on the θ is axis, respectively.
We maximize the next function subject to these constraints:
where Tr is a truncation compensation factor.
Log likelihood is:
, ( ln ln (13) 
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We cannot obtain closed form expression for the joint likelihood function. Thus we need to compute it numerically. We estimated the model in two ways: (1) maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) with direct numerical approximation, and (2) maximum simulated likelihood estimation (MSLE) using Monte Carlo methods. When we relied on MLE, we encountered a huge computational burden involved in numerical integration restricting the sample size. MSLE on the other hand places less computational burden and hence we report the estimates from MLSE. For MLSE, we selected f(θ iq , θ is ) as an importance function. To sample from a bivariate normal distribution, we began with draws from two standard normal distributions and then used the Cholesky decomposition. By matrix algebra, it is possible to decompose the bivariate normal distribution in the following way, When we maximized the simulated log likelihood, we used the same set of random draws for every computation in order to achieve continuity (1000 draws). That is, each observation has its own unchanging vector of 1000 draws. We used the BHHH (outer product of gradients) estimator to compute the asymptotic covariance matrix of the simulated maximum likelihood estimator.
Identification issues
As the three choice decisions, [(k), (q ik , s ik )] are the consequences of a single utility maximization for an individual, the model ensures that these decisions provide, in combination, the greatest possible utility to the individual. The parameters to be estimated in the study are grouped into two categories: (1) three key parameters embedded in the utility function (b q , b s and b int ) and (2) distribution-related parameter groups consisting of (μ q , μ s , σ q , σ s , and ρ for user type distribution, σ εq and σ εs for measurement error distribution). b q (price response parameter to voice service) is readily identified as the users face different marginal prices depending on whether they are satiated or not. In particular, consider a user type θ iq who is indifferent between plan k and plan k+1. In plan k, the user is using marginal minutes while in plan k+1, 22/32 the user is satiated. Thus for a slight variation around such a θ iq , the user faces different marginal costs affecting his/her voice consumption. In contrast to b q , b s cannot be directly identified because there is no change in SMS pricing -the marginal cost of SMS service is constant even around the kinked budget constraint. However, such a variation in the price of voice minutes should impact SMS consumption through the hypothesized cross effect and thus b s is (indirectly) identifiable. Through changes in marginal prices for voice, b int should be identified. 11 It is noticeable that the key parameters (b q , b s and b int ) are simultaneously estimated through not only likelihood maximization but also the unique pricing scheme causing the kinked budget constraint.
We control for heterogeneity across individuals in the derivation of the joint probability. Thus different individuals choose a different plan choice and a different consumption bundle. Distributionrelated structural parameters are identified readily due to the systematic variation in plan choice and consumptions given plan choice across individuals.
Result and discussion
The estimation results by maximizing equation (13) are given in Table 3 . We first estimate our model without incorporating any demographics (second column). One of our key interests is the sign of b int . The negative and significant b int provides the evidence that voice and SMS form a substitutive relationship. This finding give us several insights: (1) the real consumption levels, which we can observe, are less than the satiation points, which we cannot see, in both services, (2) the optimal consumption level in voice (or SMS) decreases as the consumption of the other service goes up because the consumption in one service partially satisfies the satiation points in the other service, and (3) the optimal consumption level in voice service decreases through the introduction of SMS.
The intrinsic association between satiation points in the two services is highly significantly positively related (ρ = 0.845). That is, a heavy user of one service is likely to be a heavy user of the other service regardless of substitution or complementary effect. Compared to the correlation of two services in 11 In the next section, we provide visual evidence of identification of b int . 23/32 terms of real consumptions of voice and SMS (around 0.2), the estimated ρ is very high. We can infer that if one does control for the intrinsic association of two services, one would get the biased result of the 'real' cross effect of two services. The other structural parameters (μ q , μ s , σ q , σ s ) are all reasonable and fairly precisely estimated.
All
G1 Age<30 Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *Significant at p< 0.05 **Significant at p< 0.01 Table 3 . Estimated parameters We next split the data based on demographic factors (age and gender) and analyze the difference of the key parameters across sub-groups. The results are shown from column 3 to column 7. We observe some variation of estimated parameters across either age or gender.
Younger users, on average, have higher (θ iq , θ is ) in both services. We find a stronger substitution effect in the younger group than the older group. Two price response parameters are both significant in all groups. Since b q is significantly greater than b s , we can see that the voice consumption is more sensitive to price change. We will discuss the implication of the two price response parameters in detail with the calculated own-and cross-price elasticities. 24/32
Estimated own-and cross-price elasticities
Using the estimates of b q , b s and b int , we calculate own-and cross-price elasticites based on DF3 in equation (6), as the marginal price of voice is not included in demand functions DF1 and DF2. The elasticity depends on consumed quantity in a linear demand function:
(or equivalently the reaction to proportional price changes will be quite different depending on whether prices are high or low). Here, we report the elasticities at the mean values in both services. Given the substitution effect (b int < 0), the own-price elasticities are negative and the cross price elasticities are positive. Several interesting results emerge from 
) Comparison between wireless demand and fixed line demand
On average, our estimates show that users exhibit fairly low level of elasticity for both voice and SMS services. This is somewhat consistent with landline use elasticities. The price elasticities of fixed line demand summarized in previous studies range from -0.1 to -0.5. Garbacz and Thompson (2003) 25/32 report that the demand for local service is highly inelastic (-0.006 to -0.011). Park et al. (1983) report about -0.1 or less in absolute value at experimental price levels and Kling and Ploeg (1990) show that the price elasticity of fixed phone service is in the range of -0.1.
A familiar result from the neoclassical theory of the firm holds that no firm will price in a region of its demand where the elasticity is less than one, and our results, at first blush, appear inconsistent with that finding. However, there are a number of reasons why this is not so. First, the elasticity we are measuring is not the elasticity relevant to the standard result. Consumers might respond to an increase in our firm's prices both by reducing minutes consumed and by substituting to the products of other firms.
The standard result applies to the sum of these two effects, and we examine only the latter of the two. It is easy to imagine the latter effect being the smaller of the two. Another way of saying this is that we are not measuring the residual elasticity facing the firm (what the standard theory is about) but the market elasticity of the consumers who happen to have chosen this firm. Second, the standard result applies only to static models: in a setting with stickiness in demand or other interesting dynamics, the result need not apply, and firms may price at an inelastic point. The low number that we estimate could also be the reflection of the fact that mobile services are increasingly becoming necessary to users.
(2) Comparison between voice demand and SMS demand SMS service is far less elastic than voice service. One explanation is that a specific value of SMS service exists and users perceive SMS service as a more valuable communication tool than voice service.
But, more persuasive explanation is based on the relatively small consumption -the price elasticity is calculated with not only price response parameters but also average usage (the average of SMS consumption is around 13 messages). That is, consumers are likely to be satiated with relatively small number of messages and so they might respond to the marginal price of SMS service far less than that of voice service.
We also find an asymmetric pattern in cross-price elasticities. 12 Price changes of SMS service have a larger effect on voice service than the other way around. In particular, cross-price elasticity of 12 Here, "asymmetric pattern" indicates that the magnitude is not identical. The directions are the same.
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SMS demand is extremely low (0.074 vs. 0.003 by about 20 times). 13 Given that, we can infer that users perceived voice service as the key (primary) communication tool even if there is a substitute effect.
(3) Comparison based on demographics
The results show that the price elasticities are different across age group and gender. The findings of big variation of price elasticity across individual demographic profiles could be informative for practical managerial implication. First, we find that the younger users are, on average, more inelastic than the older group in four kinds of elasticity (own and cross vs. voice and SMS). We do not have information regarding individual income. But, it is generally believed that the older users have a higher income and they are expected to be more inelastic to price change. Therefore, this is somewhat counter intuitive and gives some insight in understanding mobile service. Second, the cross-price elasticity of voice demand in group 1 is far lower than those in other groups. Therefore, we conclude that when the marginal cost of SMS increases, the older users are more likely to change the communication tool from SMS to voice than the younger are. Third, female users are more inelastic than male users in SMS service while there is no difference in voice elasticity. And the cross-price elasticity of voice demand in the female group is lower than those in the male groups. In particular, the cross-price elasticity of voice service in the male group is the highest. We can infer that when the marginal cost of SMS increase, men are more likely to change the communication tool from SMS to voice than women.
Evidence of substitution effect based on consumption bundle
We also perform regression analysis on the real consumption data of wireless services in order to acquire another evidence of substitute effect -or equivalently, to ensure that the substitutive relationship estimated by our structural model is not simply due to nonlinearities in the MLE (thus provide additional evidence of identification of b int ). When the users' voice consumption is below the free quota in their selected plan, they face zero marginal cost for voice services but positive marginal cost for SMS. Once they exceed this threshold, the voice minutes also incur a marginal cost per minute. Thus, if SMS is a 13 There could be a scaling problem in the interpretation (minute vs. message).
27/32 substitute (or complement), we should expect a significant jump (drop) in the SMS consumption when the free quota is exceeded. To test this, we run the following regression, where i indexes users and t indexes time:
, where
, otherwise 0 k FQ D captures the jump (drop) in SMS consumption before and after the free quota (or incurring a marginal cost per minute). If it is positively significant, it will provide the evidence of substitution effect based on the fact that the increment of marginal cost from 0 to 3 in voice service induces the SMS consumption to be replaced by voice service. We examined the change of SMS consumption at 350 minutes in both groups (one selecting plan 1 and the other selecting plan 2). Only users in plan 1 will face marginal price. Recall that free minutes quota for plan 1 is 350 minutes. We confirm from Table 5 We tested the same model in the narrower range of voice consumption: q i = [150, 550]. The dummy is 14 We find the same result when considering individual fixed effect. 28/32 still significant, providing stronger evidence of substitution effect. Figure 5 below captures this jump in SMS consumption around the free quota boundary. Figure 5 . Substitution effect of SMS for voice service
Policy Experiments
A key advantage of a structural model is that one can perform policy experiments and "what-if" analysis. That is, we can analyze what happens to a firm's demand and hence profits "if the fixed fee increases by 1%" or "if the firm decreases the free quota by 1%." However, it must be kept in mind that there are limitations. Our data comes from only one firm and while these customers are fairly loyal (by selection, they have been with the firm for more than one year), customers can still respond to the change of a pricing scheme by leaving the company (switching firms). Since detailed information on competitors is not available, we focus on how change in key variables affects customer demand and their propensity to shuffle the plans.
Thus conducting policy experiments capture the effects of change in the strategic pricing scheme -how it affects firm profitability. Recall that the change in any of the key variables can be not analyzed in isolation as change in any variable likely causes multiple changes in consumer behavior. For example, change in marginal cost of voice minutes will affect the demand but also will potentially affect the plan choice probability affecting the demand indirectly. Therefore, a structural model in our paper provides substantial advantages over a reduced form model as it allows us to estimate the impact of a change in variable more completely. To carry out this exercise, we perform simulations to estimate the impact of (1) 
Increase of 0.90%
Increase of 0.43% Table 6 . Simulation of change of pricing scheme
As shown in Table 6 , the changes in fixed fee have the greatest impact on the firm's revenue than other pricing change. In particular, the decrease of free minute can increase the revenue but the most effective strategy is increasing the fixed fee by 1%. The change in marginal prices of SMS service have a bigger influence on the revenue than that of voice service, which is consistent with the inference from the calculated price elasticity of demand.
Conclusion, limitation and further research direction
We provide a general methodology to construct an estimable structure which takes into account the sequential nature of consumer decision making, nonlinear pricing, and the consumption of two distinct services in the cellular industry (voice and SMS). We estimate the model with a unique and rich individual level consumption dataset. In particular, we estimate cross-price effects in a model in which we are able to control for consumer heterogeneity.
Our results show that voice and SMS services are Marshallian substitutes. The fact that they are substitutes is also confirmed with a regression model, which used the sudden change in voice services price at the threshold based on real consumption. We also find that price elasticities in wireless communication demand (-0.086 for voice and -0.031 for SMS) are less than what has been observed in landline phones where many researchers have reported elasticities in the range of -0.1 to -0.5. We also explore how user sensitivity varies depending on demographic characteristics. We find that older users are more price-sensitive and that there is little difference between the consumption patterns of males and females. The extent of substitution effect and price elasticity somewhat depends on users' demographic 30/32 factors. The distinction of the inherent association and the price elasticities can be very informative for practical managerial implication such as optimal pricing scheme. Through policy experiments, we find that the tactical change of the entering fee is most effective in increasing the firm's profit.
The last point is particularly important because the contribution of this paper goes beyond the rich dataset we have collected. It is also the structural model we build that allows us to identify and estimate key elasticity parameters that otherwise would not be possible with a naïve reduced form model.
Thus our methodology provides us insights into consumer behavior that otherwise would escape us. Thus, our research provides interesting avenues for future research in an important and growing field of cellular voice and data communication.
While the richness of the data is a key strength, it is not without limitations. We do not have detailed information on consumer (disposable) income. Therefore, our analytical framework doesn't reflect on how individual users allocate their monthly budget to mobile communication and outside goods.
In reality, users are expected to make decisions of budget allocation by comparing the utility from mobile service and that from others. We cannot accommodate this feature in our model. Our data is also limited to one firm. In particular, own-price and cross-price elasticities should be interpreted with caution due to lack of competitor data.
Our model also employs specific functional forms for the utility structure and assumes distributional forms for various parameters. While many of these assumptions are widely used in literature, our results should be interpreted appropriately. Our current work is focused on Voice and SMS in mobile service. Future work should analyze more prominent data services like WAP (Wireless Application Protocol). These technologies allow users to download a richer set of data than text messaging. We believe our paper takes a step in this direction and informs readers of the dataset and models needed to explore this domain.
